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Replicability 1 
Abstract 
The main goal of our target article was to provide concrete recommendations for improving the 
replicability of research findings. Most of the comments focus on this point. In addition, a few 
comments were concerned with the distinction between replicability and generalizability and the 
role of theory in replication. We address all comments within the conceptual structure of the 
target article, and hope to convince readers that replication in psychological science amounts to 
much more than hitting the lottery twice. 
 
We thank the commentators for their thoughtful, and sometimes amusing, remarks, constructive 
criticism, and suggestions. We are delighted that most comments focus on concrete 
recommendations for improving the replicability of research findings, even by describing 
concrete actions in line with some of our recommendations (e. g., Simpson, Spellman). Thereby 
the peer commentary section and, hopefully, also our responses contribute to the translation of 
the current debate in psychology about the non-replicability of research findings toward concrete 
recommendations for improving replicability. To us, the most important, popular mindset to 
address was expressed best by King – that replication is akin to “hitting the lottery. Twice.” In 
this response we hope to convince readers to alter their mindset that empirical research is a game 
of luck, and instead to remember that the goal of any empirical study is to learn something. The 
role of chance in research is in providing an indication of confidence in the result, not in 
determining whether we won the game. 
What is Historically Different? 
 Commenters noted the historical context of recognizing challenges in replicability and of 
failing to take action or find correctives (see particularly Westmeyer and King). The intense 
Replicability 2 
discussion at present could wither as well. However, we believe that it is different this time. 
First, prior cycles of this debate were somewhat isolated to different areas of psychology and 
other disciplines. This time, the discussion is an explicit, intense and widespread debate about 
the extent and the causes of non-replication. The issue is dominating discussion across the 
sciences and includes all major stakeholders – societies, journals, funders, and scientists 
themselves. This gives the debate a stronger impetus than ever before, which, if wisely 
channeled toward "getting it right", raises the stakes for a truly self-correcting movement in our 
science. 
 Second, the contributors to the debate recognized that the issue is systemic – not isolated 
to a particular practice, discipline, or part of the research process. Our target article 
acknowledges this by recommending actions at multiple levels. Third, there exists an 
infrastructure – the Internet – that can enable solutions like data sharing on a scale that was 
simply not conceivable in previous epochs. Now, the barriers are not technical, they are social. 
Therefore we are more optimistic than some of the commentators that the current debate offers 
opportunity for real reform and improvement. 
Need for Replication 
 Two commentators questioned the need for conducting replication studies. Francis 
questioned replicability as a core requirement for psychological findings by drawing a distinction 
between physics and chemistry on the one hand and psychology on the other because 
psychological findings are more "uncertain". But, as quantum physics teaches us, uncertainty is 
inherent in many physical phenomena, and the role of statistics is to solve problems of 
probabilistic relations, whether in physics, chemistry, or psychology. Later, Francis continues to 
recommend meta-analysis as a solution for reducing uncertainty, and here we agree. But his 
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arguments draw a false distinction between replication and meta-analysis. Replication is the stuff 
that makes meta-analysis possible (see also our section in the target article on "small" meta-
analyses for evaluating the replicability of an effect size). 
 Schimmack and Dinolfo do not question the importance of replicability but they do 
question the usefulness of replication studies, with the argument that such studies are not needed 
if the original study was sufficiently powered. While we certainly agree with the call for greater 
power, it is not realistic to imagine that all studies will be sufficiently powered. The central 
challenge is resource allocation. Researchers that are pushing the boundaries of knowledge take 
risks and venture into the unknown. In these cases, it is easy to justify placing a small bet to see 
if the idea has any merit. It is very difficult to justify placing a large bet at the outset of a 
research program. We agree this research strategy can lead to more false positives with lots of 
small bets, but it is also a means of reducing false negatives. If we can only place large bets, then 
we will take very few risks and miss perhaps the most important opportunities to learn 
something. So, what is the solution? Replication. When one finds some initial evidence, then a 
larger bet is justifiable. Our suggestion is that it is not only justifiable; it is essential. We believe 
that this strategy recognizes the challenges facing the pursuit of innovation and confirmation in 
knowledge accumulation.  
 Although it is true that one well-powered study is better than two, each with half the 
sample size (see also our section in the target article on the dangers of multiple underpowered 
studies), the argument ignores the point, reiterated by many other commentators, that exact 
replication is never possible; even studies designed as direct replications will inevitably vary 
some more or less subtle features of the original study. Thus, replication studies have merits even 
in an ideal Schimmack World where only well-powered studies are conducted, by making sure 
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that the design described by the original authors and copied by the replicators sufficiently 
describes all causally relevant features. In many areas of current psychology, well-powered 
replication attempts of equally well-powered original studies will sometimes fail, turning the 
replication studies into assessments of the limits of generalizability.  
From Replicability to Generalizability 
 We view direct replicability as one extreme pole of a continuous dimension extending to 
broad generalizability at the other pole, ranging across multiple, theoretically relevant facets of 
study design. Cacioppo and Caccioppo called direct replication "minimal replication" and 
linked non-generalization to fruitful theoretical challenges. We fully endorse this view (see also 
IJzerman et al.). When replication fails, it can provide an opportunity for condition-seeking – 
what are the boundary conditions for the effect? - that can stimulate theory advancement. We 
also like the argument by Cacioppo and Caccioppo that the multiple determination of virtually 
all psychological phenomena requires generalization rather than replication studies in order to 
fully appreciate a phenomenon. Nevertheless, we insist that replicability is a necessary condition 
for further generalization and thus indispensable for building solid starting points for theoretical 
development. Without such starting points, research may get lost in endless fluctuation between 
alternative generalization studies that add numerous boundary conditions but fail to advance 
theory. 
Role of Theory 
 We agree that our recommendations could have done more to emphasize the role of 
theory. As Simpson correctly noted, we only briefly cited theory as a means of guiding the 
selection or construction of relevant design facets. The main reason is that our focus was on 
replication, not on generalization. In any case, we fully endorse Simpson's and Eid's view on the 
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importance of theory for determining the relevant facets of the design, for operationalizing them 
such that they fit the underlying theory, and for generating a design that is best suited to study 
the expected effects. Also, we like Eid's discussion of the importance of deciding what should be 
considered measurement error and what should be considered substantive variation on theoretical 
grounds, and his reminder that in many areas of psychology theories for important facets are 
under-developed or completely missing (e. g., a theory of stimuli as a prerequisite of a 
contexualized theory of perception, or a theory of situations as a prerequisite of a contextualized 
theory of personality). We only insist that replication studies have their own virtue by providing 
solid starting points for generalization (see also the preceding section). 
Study Design and Data Analysis 
 Only two comments focused directly on these issues. Eid noted that facets should not 
exclusively be considered as random; whether they should be considered random or fixed is a 
theoretical issue. Actually, we did not propose in the target article that all facets should be 
considered random; instead, we proposed that researchers should at least consider that a facet 
might be better defined as random rather than fixed. Whereas individuals are routinely treated as 
random factors, stimuli or situations are routinely considered fixed in most studies even though 
there are often good reasons for treating them as random, as well. Related was Westmeyer's 
remark that we discussed only designs including samples of individuals, ignoring single-case 
studies. We agree that we should have noted that our facet approach does include single case 
studies as designs with no variation on the facet of individuals, just as many cross-sectional 
studies are designs with no variation on the facet of developmental time. 
Publication Process 
 Many comments concerned our recommendations for reforming the publication process 
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on the part of reviewers, editors, and journals. We were most curious to read the comments by 
Fanelli because of his bird's eyes view on psychological publications in the context of 
publications in other areas of science, and by the editors of flagship journals, King, Simpson and 
Spellman, because we were quite critical about the current policies of many such journals that 
discourage direct replications and encourage sequences of under-powered studies. 
 Fanelli's remark about an equal citation rate of negative and positive results in 
psychological publications took us by surprise, because in the target article we discussed 
confirmation bias of authors and publication bias of journal policies but not citation bias. Also, it 
seems to us that Fanelli underestimated the ability to predict study outcomes in at least some 
areas of psychology. To cite examples from personality psychology, the effect size of certain 
gender differences, the agreement between self and others on reliable measures of the Big Five 
factors of personality, and the longitudinal stability of such measures across a specified retest 
interval starting at a particular age can be predicted quite well. Psychology is not astrophysics, to 
be sure, but it offers much better predictions than astrology. 
 Therefore we disagree with Fanelli's negative view on the pre-registration of hypotheses 
based on his assumption of low predictability. Instead, we consider pre-registration to be one of 
the most promising means for confirmatory testing. When the researcher has a strong a priori 
hypothesis, the best way to affirm the p-value’s uncertainty estimation is to register the analysis 
plan in advance. Without it, flexibility in analysis strategies and motivated reasoning can lead to 
inflation of false positives, and reduction of replicability in the process (see also the section on 
multiple hypothesis testing in the target article and King's remarks on pre-registration during 
longer review processes). 
 We fully agree with Fanelli's view on the merits of purely exploratory research, but if 
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and only if the research process and the results are fully and transparently reported. Such 
transparency requires standards for reporting, and we consider Fanelli's suggestions for more 
specific reporting guidelines to be adopted by major journals a welcome addition to our own 
recommendations. 
 King's call for “slowing down,” by pressing authors for additional work invested in 
conducting additional studies or ruling out alternative explanations, is well taken in the current 
mad rush for quick-and-many publications. We would only add that instead of responding to a 
low-powered study by plain desk rejection as recommended by Lucas and Donnellan, a more 
constructive slowing-down response might be to ask for additional data to achieve sufficient 
power. An even better approach would be to take Cohen's call for sufficiently powered research 
seriously, just as many journals finally are beginning to take his call for reporting effect sizes 
seriously. Why do journals not adopt explicit rules that only studies with sufficient power to 
address their main research questions should be be submitted? 
 For example, in line with conventional rules, we may define as acceptable thresholds 
power at 0.80 with alpha at 0.05. Given that recent meta-analyses converge in indicating that the 
average effect size in published psychological research is around d=0.50, an approximate power 
calculation would result in n=100 for a one-tail hypothesis for a simple between-participants 
design (2 groups) or a correlation coefficient (1 group). Of course, there are many exceptions; 
within-participants designs have much more power, several effects are greater than d = 0.50 and 
so on. Therefore, this guideline should be flexible and adjustable to specific studies. 
 The adoption of such a simple but flexible guideline would provide a clear incentive to 
authors to make a case, if needed, why in their specific study a different effect size should be 
expected given previous relevant studies and reasonable arguments. Thus the authors should be 
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able to justify why their specific sample size should give trustable results given the expected or 
investigated effect, without considering the results reported in their study. If they don’t do this, 
then the default rule of n>100 would apply automatically, regardless of whether there are 
significant effects. Adoption of such rules would reduce the number of false positives and slow 
down the rate of publications, and slow publication in this sense may eventually become an 
indicator of quality similar to slow food. 
 For reasons spelled out in detail in the target article we strongly disagree with Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology: Personality Processes and Individual Differences editor 
King's statement that replication studies should not be published in top journals. Interestingly, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes 
editor Simpson seems more favorable toward replication studies, at least if they present solid 
evidence that a seemingly established finding is not valid. We applaud Simpson's view and 
would only ask that it should particularly be applied to the non-replication of findings published 
earlier in the same journal. After a decade of non-replications of single gene and fMRI results 
published in top biomedical journals we are confident that such a policy would increase rather 
than decrease the reputation of any psychology journal that followed it. 
 We also share Simpson's view that transparency, data archiving and data sharing are 
particularly important for costly longitudinal and behavioral observation studies. Many funding 
agencies now require these for large projects, and journals could join the bandwagon by 
requiring them too, as long as confidentiality concerns or legal rights are not violated. In fact, 
APA publication guideline 8.14 requires data sharing on request of competent peers  "provided 
that the confidentiality of the participants can be protected and unless legal rights concerning 
proprietary data preclude their release", but it seems that this guideline is not taken seriously by 
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authors and editors (Wicherts, Bakker & Molenaar, 2011). Retraction of an article because of 
violation of this guideline (as suggested by Lucas and Donnellan) should be a last resort, but a 
letter from the editor reminding an author of the commitment he or she has already signed may 
help to increase the author’s willingness to share data with peers. 
 We were particularly pleased by Spellman's announcement that Perspectives on 
Psychological Science (PPS) will soon take up our suggestion of launching calls to replicate 
important but controversial findings with a guarantee of publication, provided that there is 
agreement on method before the study is conducted. In this action, PPS converges with the 
European Journal of Personality which encourages such activities as well as articles concerned 
with replication issues. Spreading similar pro-active encouragement of replication elsewhere 
would pay off much of our efforts. It would undoubtedly increase researchers' awareness of the 
importance of replicable findings and dampen the unhealthy tendency over the past decade to 
increasingly look out for "sexy" but unreliable findings that appeal to the mass media. 
 In his comment on this issue, Simons correctly pointed out that the "sexiness" of a 
publication should not be a criterion for its quality, and we do not consider "sexiness" as 
necessarily bad either. However, Simons' conclusion that "...sexy findings that withstand 
replication are the ones that we want in our journals" could be interpreted as "sexy replicable 
findings are better than non-sexy replicable findings" which would run against the independence 
of "sexiness" and scientific quality. 
 In a similar vein, we are skeptical about King's call for slowing down by concentrating 
on “significant” research questions. Although there are surely many non-significant questions 
around, what is viewed as significant may depend on what issues are currently mainstream and 
the flux and flow of fashions. Trying to steer science by significant questions may be as short-
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sighted as steering science by application questions. The history of science is full of examples 
where answers to questions that seemed awkward or trivial at the time, later became critically 
important in a different and unforeseen context.  
Teaching 
 The enthusiastic comment by IJzerman et al. on the joys of teaching the importance of 
replication somewhat compensates for the fact that these joys were based on N = 3 students. 
Hunt's perception that we are recommending more teaching of methodology and statistics, 
probably the most unpopular subjects for most psychology students at most departments, is a 
misperception. We do not recommend more methodology and statistics, we recommend certain 
shifts of focus within the teaching of methodology and statistics (e. g. from null hypothesis 
testing in single studies to replication of effect sizes in multiple studies). 
Institutional Incentives 
 After many of us used Google to learn about Hunt's usage of "motherhood and apple pie" 
(it is always enchanting to learn new phrases of local dialect), we were curious to additionally 
learn what concrete recommendations he might offer that would differ from our own. We found 
two but disagree with both. First, we disagree with "Creating archives before record-keeping 
standards are established puts the cart before the horse". Standardization for documentation 
(within limits) is certainly a worthwhile goal, but waiting for standards is a good way to 
guarantee that archives will never happen. As the Internet age has demonstrated (see e.g., 
formatting standards on Wikipedia) standards for communication are more productively pursued 
as an emergent quality with existing data rather than developed in the abstract and then applied 
en masse. Waiting until professional societies agree on standards would be counterproductive – 
both for increasing sharing and for developing the standards. 
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 Second, we disagree with Hunt's suggestion that impact should be the sole criterion for 
launching replication studies. Relevance to scientific theory and opportunities to resolve 
controversy seem more important to us, and these are not always the same as impact. But we do 
agree with Bakker et al. that highly cited textbook findings need to be shown to be replicable; 
"textbook proof" is not sufficient, and we are pleased to see initiatives such as Open Science 
Framework (http://openscienceframework.org/) and PsychFileDrawer 
(http://psychfiledrawer.org/) providing an environment for uploading and discussing the results 
of such replication studies. 
 Rieth et al.'s call for clearer signals of authors' confidence is not without merits but we 
are more than skeptical about the specific suggestion of a bounty for non-replication. Assuming 
that the suggestion is serious and not satirical, such a measure would be misguided for two 
reasons. First, it would contribute to unhealthy tendencies to focus only on scientists' extrinsic 
motivation. As motivational psychology tells us, intrinsic motivations such as striving for 
discovery and truth can be corrupted by monetary reward and punishment. Second, if one wants 
to use money as an incentive, rewarding replications would seem much more productive (e .g. by 
reserving a percentage of grant money for replication) than punishing non-replication. The best 
way of "changing hearts and minds" (Lucas and Donnellan) seems to us using incentives that 
enhance intrinsic motivation ("getting it better") and to incentives related to peer reputation, as 
spelled out in some detail in the target article.  
Conclusion 
 Taken as a package, we hope that our and the commentators' recommendations will 
counteract feelings of some colleagues that successful replication amounts to hitting the lottery 
twice. We are convinced that psychological science can do much better than that now, and even 
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more so in the near future. 
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